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R867Crucially, this effort should identify 
specific legal concepts and standards 
that are either incommensurable 
with neuroscience, or for which the 
law indicates that neuroscientific 
evidence is unnecessary or 
unwanted. The law is not compelled 
to use neuroscientific evidence to 
render its decisions; judgments 
made on the basis of moral intuition, 
normative preference, or institutional 
precedent do not require the consult 
of neuroscientist. However, the use 
of neuroscientific evidence to make 
legal determinations about minds and 
brains should be constrained by the 
limits of scientific inference. Good 
law cannot follow from bad, or badly 
used, science. 
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Behavioral economics uses evidence 
from psychology and other social 
sciences to create a precise and 
fruitful alternative to traditional 
economic theories, which are 
based on optimization. Behavioral 
economics may interest some 
biologists, as it shifts the basis 
for theories of economic choice 
away from logical calculation and 
maximization and toward biologically 
plausible mechanisms.
Before this behavioral shift, 
economic theories assumed that 
agents have subjective numerical 
utilities for bundles of goods and 
services. Optimizing agents choose 
the utility-maximizing bundle given 
constraints determined by prices, 
available information and income. 
This ‘constrained optimization’ 
approach was never intended 
to be a realistic model of human 
cognition. Instead, the guess was 
that predictions based on the 
optimization model — such as how 
people respond to a change in the 
tax on alcohol — would be roughly 
accurate, perhaps after some period 
of adjustment to the change. 
The behavioral-economics 
alternative adds limits to 
computational ability, willpower 
and selfishness to the historical 
optimization approach. Knowledge of 
these limits comes from psychology 
and, more recently, neuroscience. In 
this general behavioral view, prices, 
income and information certainly 
affect behavior. However, the way 
in which information is processed 
to make choices can be described 
by psychological principles that 
often are not statistically optimal. 
Other psychological factors, such 
as how choices are described (or, 
equivalently, framed) and attended 
to, can affect economic behavior 
as well.
Behavioral economics is especially 
useful when decisions are complex 
and optimality is difficult to achieve. 
These decisions include some of the 
most important choices people make, 
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Figure 1. The break-even effect.
Net winnings of casino gamblers during a single begin-and-end gambling session over a one-
month period (n = 2392). The large spike around zero (and small losses) indicates a break-even 
effect. Gamblers who start to win appear to keep gambling until they get close to zero (hence the 
absence of large net wins). Gamblers who fall far behind (by more than $400) seem to keep gam-
bling until they break even or lose a much larger amount (shown by the left tail). Data reprinted with 
permission from Jamie Lien and Jie Zheng.such as education, career, buying 
cars and houses, and even mate 
choice and child-bearing.
Complexities in economic choices
Here, I consider four types of 
complexity: risk, time, strategizing, 
and prosociality. In each case, 
specialized behavioral theories have 
emerged that explain a variety of lab 
and field data and are beginning to 
be understood at the neural level. 
Risk
Most natural choices yield a 
probability distribution over possible 
rewards or outcomes, such as 
ripeness of foraged fruit or how 
long a new Apple computer will last. 
These probabilities quantify the 
notion of risk. A risk is a statistical 
likelihood of a particular outcome, 
whether good or bad. How are such 
risks valued? One theory is that risky 
choices are described by various 
statistical moments, particularly 
the mean (or expected value) and 
variance. Human studies have shown 
reliable encodings of expected value in striatum and of variance in insular 
cortex. Insula activity suggests that 
risk is ‘felt’ emotionally, which may 
explain why people are overly fearful 
of rare, vivid events (e.g. airplane 
crashes).
A different approach, called 
‘prospect theory’, comes from 
psychology. In prospect theory, 
rewards are valued relative to a point 
of reference, r, and the subjective 
value of losses is  times larger 
than the value of equal-sized gains 
(a property called ‘loss-aversion’; 
u(-x) = -u(x) for x > 0). In addition, a 
probability p is weighted nonlinearly 
through a function (p), which may 
weight rare events too heavily or, in 
the other extreme, so lightly that they 
are altogether ignored.
Prospect theory incorporates 
these probability weights in 
a psychologically plausible 
reconceptualization of ‘expected 
utility’, i (p(xi))u(xi – r), where xi 
are all possible outcomes. (In its 
standard formulation, expected utility 
hypothesizes that gambles are valued 
according to the probability-weighted average of utilities, i p(xi)u(xi)). The 
logic underlying expected utility is 
that when two risks share a common 
outcome X with common probability 
p(X), that common (X,p(X)) element 
can be cancelled out when comparing 
the two risks. 
This cancellation principle is 
logically appealing. However, it is 
biologically implausible, because 
it supposes that people naturally 
dissect and focus only on differences 
in mentally represented risks in 
making choices. The cancellation 
principle is reliably violated by the 
choices that subjects make, both 
in decades of lab experiments with 
humans and many other species, 
and in field data from financial and 
gambling markets. 
The sensitivity to a reference point 
for value proposed by prospect theory 
corresponds to the natural tendency 
of human biological systems to 
adapt to current states. Learning 
is also facilitated by computing 
the difference between reward and 
a reference state (or prediction), 
called ‘reward prediction errors’. 
Dependence on reference points has 
been shown in many experiments as 
well as in field studies about sales of 
stocks and houses, and decisions by 
taxi drivers about how long to work. 
A clear example is that gamblers have 
a very strong preference to quit when 
they break even, or at a small loss 
(Figure 1). Gamblers who are winning 
typically keep gambling (and lose on 
average), so the resulting distribution 
of net winnings has a few gamblers 
winning money, a huge spike near 
zero, and a long, sad left tail of big 
losers who kept trying to break even 
and could not.
Time
Most human choices create costs 
and benefits that are distributed 
across time. Humans are consistently 
challenged by choices that are 
unpleasant now and (at least 
abstractly) valuable later — such 
as exercise — or delicious now and 
deadly later — such as cheeseburgers 
and cocaine. Simple computational 
models of these intertemporal 
tradeoffs assume that costs and 
rewards at future times, t, are 
discounted by a weight w(t) < 1. 
There are many theories about the 
shape of the w(t) function and its 
neural implementation. Economic 
theories favor an exponential 
Special Issue
R869
Figure 2. Predictions and actual number choices in the LUPI lottery. 
Data histogram of number choices in the first week of a LUPI lottery in Sweden. Players 
(n = 53,000 on average) choose positive integers up to 99,999; the lowest unique integer wins 
a fixed prize. The dotted line shows the zero-parameter prediction of game theory (Poisson-
Nash equilibrium). Compared to this prediction, too many people choose low numbers (<1000) 
and high numbers (>5500). The solid line shows the best-fitting cognitive hierarchy (CH) model 
with softmax response, with an average number of thinking steps of 1.80 (close to the number 
estimated in many experimental data sets). Reprinted with permission from Ostling et al. (2011).function, w(t) = t, which enforces 
the logical principle that future plans 
will actually be carried out when the 
future arrives. However, the hyperbolic 
function w(t) = 1/(1+kt) typically 
fits data better. Early debate in 
neuroeconomics produced evidence 
in favor of both the exponential and 
hyperbolic theories. 
Theories assuming stable 
weighting of rewards over time are 
challenged by evidence that current 
and future rewards are treated very 
differently when small, seemingly 
inconsequential changes in their 
presentation and description are 
made. For example, describing a 
week as seven days makes the 
delay seem longer and increases 
impatience. 
The distinction between ‘model-
free learned valuation’ and ‘model-
based mentally constructed valuation’ 
helps make sense of these data on 
differences in choices over time. In 
an exemplar study, subjects chose 
between ‘smaller, sooner’ (SS) or 
‘larger, later’ (LL) rewards. In the 
control condition, LL rewards were 
offered on a schedule given in 
terms of time only. In the ‘episodic’ 
condition, the LL rewards were 
scheduled to occur on dates — 
called episode tags — of personal 
significance (both positive and 
negative) to the subjects. When 
making subjective choices between 
SS and LL rewards, subjects put 
higher weight on later rewards when 
they occurred on episode-tagged 
days. Activity in the memory-storage 
hippocampal region was associated 
with the tag effect.
Strategizing
Many important economic 
interactions are social — that is, 
what one person does has an 
effect on another person, by either 
helping (cooperatively) or hurting 
(competitively) him or her. Game 
theory is a theory of such social 
interactions, in which agents 
choose strategies, given available 
information, and the collective 
strategies chosen by all agents create 
a general outcome, which each agent 
assigns a numerical value.
The most common analysis in 
game theory assumes that all agents 
correctly guess what others will 
do and consequently choose their 
optimal strategy in light of that guess. 
These assumptions imply a learned balance or equilibrium in choices and 
guesses. 
Despite its theoretical elegance, 
equilibrium analysis is often a 
poor empirical description of what 
happens before agents can learn 
or figure things out. Behavioral 
economics offers a different theory, 
called a ‘cognitive hierarchy’ or 
‘level-k’ theory. In cognitive hierarchy, 
there is a hierarchy of player 
reasoning. The lowest-level players 
(level 0) choose a heuristic, focal 
strategy (not thinking about what 
others are likely to do). Players doing 
k levels of reasoning are partially 
strategic, because they correctly 
anticipate what players at levels 0 to 
k – 1 do but neglect actions of players 
at level k and above. This theory 
gives a promising account of data 
from lab and field strategic choices, 
and it provides an explanation for 
experimental observations of visual 
fixations to possible payoffs and 
congruent fMRI data.
These ideas are illustrated by 
data from a Swedish lottery, in which people pick five-digit whole 
numbers (1 to 99,999), with the lowest 
unique number winning a large prize 
(Figure 2). People want to pick low 
numbers but also want to choose 
numbers that nobody else will think to 
pick. Mathematically, the theoretical 
equilibrium is a statistical mixture in 
which numbers from 1 to 5513 are 
chosen most often, with declining 
frequency, and higher numbers are 
very rarely chosen. In reality, very 
low numbers are chosen far more 
often than predicted. Presumably 
this happens because naïve lottery 
players do not realize that others are 
likely to choose those numbers too, 
which will render them non-unique. 
The cognitive hierarchy theory fits the 
data much better than the equilibrium 
approach, with an estimated average 
thinking level of 1.80, a number close 
to many lab estimates. 
Prosociality
Most economic analyses assume that 
people are narrowly self-interested. 
Behavioral economics has explored 
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prosociality. 
The simplest prosocial motive is 
to reduce inequality in what different 
people get. A more complex motive 
is reciprocity, which corresponds 
to rewarding or punishing others 
based on their actions toward you. 
A motive that is even more delicate 
is social image — i.e., wanting to 
be perceived by other people as 
generous. Experiments have shown 
evidence for all of these motives. 
For example, in strategic games in 
which people can contribute their 
own money to help others, people 
are usually somewhat generous 
(tending to decrease inequality), 
contribute more if they think others 
will (due to positive reciprocity), and 
give more when their contributions 
are identified publicly. These human 
social motives are also modulated by 
group membership, in ways that are 
undoubtedly linked in some way to 
group affiliation in nonhuman apes 
and primates. 
Neuroeconomic foundations 
A new synthesis of psychology, 
economics, and neuroscience — 
called ‘neuroeconomics’ (or decision 
neuroscience) — investigates which 
economic theories are consistent 
with biological computation. 
Many neuroscientific studies show 
that choices are guided by multiple 
controllers. General controllers are: 
innate value of primary rewards 
and punishments, which do not 
require learning (such as food or 
pain); ‘model-free’ action-reward 
values Q(a) learned by trial-and-
error; and model-based goal values, 
denoted Q(s,a), which require mental 
representation of how actions a in 
different states s lead to rewards. 
In contrast, the standard economic 
model of choice hypothesizes that 
the optimal action, a*, is flexibly 
chosen to maximize Q(s,a*), where 
the state, s, includes current 
information, prices, and income, 
and the value of a* reflects a stable 
‘preference’.
Knowledge of neural controllers 
suggests that actual choices could 
depart from flexible maximization 
in three different ways: first, during 
model-free learning of Q(a), the 
learned value of an action will change 
over time (i.e., preferences are 
learned and hence are not always 
stable).Second, after a steady-state 
action value is learned, if it is 
repeated frequently enough, it can 
become overlearned or ‘habitual’. 
By definition, a habitual action does 
not respond to information, prices, 
or income, as assumed in economic 
theory. Overlearned, insensitive 
habits of this type could describe 
short-run behavior during addiction, 
mindless eating, brand loyalty, social 
conformity, and other private choices 
that add up to important social trends. 
Third, model-based valuation 
of Q(s,a) requires conceptual 
representations, which are influenced 
by principles of memory, association, 
social norms and imitation as well as 
other influences. Precisely because 
this kind of valuation must be flexible, 
it can lead to action choices that 
are likely to be overly responsive to 
small changes in how choices and 
states are described. Furthermore, in 
market economies, profit-maximizing 
firms can be motivated to create 
descriptions that exploit properties 
of conceptual representation, so that 
people overpay for goods with high 
perceived Q(s,a). 
What about markets? 
Economic analysis is generally 
concerned with aggregate behavior 
in markets, political systems, and 
entire economies (macroeconomics). 
A good model of individual choice is 
the foundation for studying collective 
behavior. Therefore, behavioral 
economics must always address the 
central question of how biological 
tendencies of individual agents are 
either limited or amplified by market 
and political forces. 
The longstanding premise in 
economics is that even if many agents 
make mistakes, market structures 
lead to prices and allocations that are 
approximately optimal. For example, 
suppose most people are not sure 
how long they will live and tend to 
wishfully overestimate their longevity. 
Life insurance is priced by highly 
skilled actuaries (who can forecast 
longevity for classes of people). If 
there is little competition, companies 
will offer insurance with a big payoff 
if people live an unusually long time. 
Optimistic people will buy it, and 
insurance companies will earn extra 
profits. However, if consumers shop 
around and companies compete, 
prices can be driven to the actuarially 
correct level. As this example illustrates, 
markets create incentives for firms 
to take advantage of customers’ 
mental limits. Whether these limits 
are exploited depends on how 
much firms compete and how well 
customers — and both government 
and private institutions (such as 
Consumer Reports or Yelp) — ‘police’ 
the market. 
Behavioral economics has 
contributed some ideas about how 
firms and governments can improve 
consumer choice. The best example 
so far was inspired by the discovery 
that people disproportionately 
prefer the ‘default’ choice, i.e., the 
choice that is imposed unless they 
‘opt out’ of it and into a different 
choice. Several companies changed 
their policies so that workers were 
defaulted into a 401(k) retirement 
plan (unless they opted out), which 
put a fraction of their next pay raise 
into tax-deferred savings. This clever 
system guarantees that take-home 
pay does not go down when savings 
levels are increased — because the 
extra savings come out of a pay 
raise — and commits to savings 
increases that will take place in the 
future, a delayed self-control that 
people find easier to accept. 
Future trends in behavioral 
economics 
Behavioral economics is moving in 
several directions. One direction, 
mentioned just above, is to prescribe 
ways to construct choices to help 
people of average mental skill 
avoid making bad decisions, while 
preserving freedom of choice for 
people who are confident that they 
don’t make mistakes. A related 
direction is looking for evidence of 
how well behavioral principles can be 
used to explain prices and allocations 
in everyday markets, such as asset 
and labor markets. 
Exploring the neural basis of 
economics is progressing rapidly, 
helped along by the fact that 
mathematical expressions of neural 
computation can be compared to the 
math used to describe economic-
utility maximization. An untapped 
potential contribution of economics 
to neuroscience is the idea that 
everyday choices that people face 
are specifically designed, by market 
and political forces, to bias choice 
toward what the designer wants to 
happen. Little is known about how 
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‘adversarial’ choices. 
Linking directly with biology, 
there is a large undergoing effort to 
combine data from many studies 
with socioeconomic outcomes and 
genome-wide association data 
to greatly improve the statistical 
power needed to identify genuine 
associations. Economists also 
use the language of evolutionary 
selection to describe and explain 
aspects of human behavior and 
institutions, but they have not done 
so with both formal discipline and 
careful observation. More direct 
communication with biologists would 
be useful in such a synthesis. 
Further reading
Benartzi, S., and Thaler, R.H. (2013). Behavioral 
economics and the retirement savings crisis. 
Science 339, 1152–1153.
Camerer, C.F. (1995). Individual decision making. 
In Handbook of Experimental Economics, 
J.H. Kagel and A.E. Roth, eds. (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press).
Camerer, C.F. (2013). Goals, methods, and 
progress in neuroeconomics. Annu. Rev.
Economics 5, 425–455.
Crawford, V.P., Costa-Gomes, M.A., and Iriberri, N. 
(2013). Structural models of nonequilibrium 
strategic thinking: Theory, evidence, and 
applications. J. Economic Literature 51, 5–62.
Daw, N.D., and Tobler, P.N. (2014). Value 
learning through reinforcement: The basics 
of dopamine and reinforcement learning. 
In Neuroeconomics (Second Edition), P.W. 
Glimcher and E. Fehr, eds. (San Diego, CA: 
Academic Press), pp. 283–298.
DellaVigna, S. (2009). Psychology and economics: 
Evidence from the field. J. Economic Literature 
47, 315–372.
Frydman, C., Barberis, N., Camerer, C., 
Bossaerts, P., and Rangel, A. (2014). Using 
neural data to test a theory of investor behavior: 
An application to realization utility. J. Finance 
69, 907–994.
Glimcher, P.W. (2010). Foundations of 
Neuroeconomic Analysis (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press).
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect 
theory: An analysis of decision under risk. 
Econometrica 47, 263–291.
Lak, A., Stauffer, W.R., and Schultz, W. (2014). 
Dopamine prediction error responses integrate 
subjective value from different reward 
dimensions. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 111, 
2343–2348.
Mullainathan, S., and Thaler, R. (2000). Behavioral 
Economics: Entry in International Encyclopedia 
of the Social and Behavioral Sciences 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press).
Ostling, R., Wang, J.T.-y., Chou, E.Y., and Camerer, 
C.F. (2011). Testing game theory in the field: 
Swedish LUPI lottery games. Am. Economic J.: 
Microeconomics 3, 1–33.
Peters, J., and Büchel, C. (2010). Episodic future 
thinking reduces reward delay discounting 
through an enhancement of prefrontal-
mediotemporal interactions. Neuron 66, 
138–148.
Robson, A.J., and Samuelson, L. (2010). The 
evolutionary foundations of preferences. In 
Handbook of Social Economics. (Amsterdam: 
North Holland: Elsevier).
HSS 228-77 Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125, 
USA.  
E-mail: camerer@hss.caltech.eduPsychopathy
Essi Viding1,2,*, Eamon McCrory1,  
and Ana Seara-Cardoso1
Psychopathy is a condition that 
has long captured the public 
imagination. Newspaper column 
inches are devoted to murderers 
with psychopathic features and 
movies such as No Country for Old 
Men and We Need to Talk About 
Kevin focus on characters who are 
exceptionally cold and callous. 
Psychopathy is in fact a personality 
disorder characterised by lack of 
empathy and guilt, shallow affect, 
manipulation of other people and 
severe, premeditated and violent 
antisocial behaviour. Individuals with 
psychopathy generate substantial 
societal costs both as a direct 
financial consequence of their 
offending behaviour and lack of 
normal participation in working life, 
but also in terms of the emotional 
and psychological costs to their 
victims. 
Manifestations of psychopathic 
traits and behaviours are evident 
from early childhood and, although 
it is entirely inappropriate to label 
children as psychopaths, it is clear 
that callous-unemotional traits that 
characterise adults with psychopathy 
can also be reliably observed in 
children and predict increased risk 
for persistent antisocial behaviour. 
In this primer, we will provide 
an overview of the research on 
the manifestation and causes 
of psychopathy. We will start by 
describing a ‘case history’ — an 
amalgamation of cases we have 
encountered during our research 
and clinical careers — that aims 
to capture what an individual with 
psychopathy is like. Throughout, 
we take a life-course perspective 
describing findings from studies 
of children at risk for developing 
psychopathy — those with antisocial 
behaviour and callous-unemotional 
traits — and adults with psychopathy. 
Mark was the second-born child 
of Lisa and Tom. Following the 
unplanned birth of their first child, 
Tom had to leave college and take a 
job at the local storage facility. As a 
result, the family struggled financially 
and Lisa was often depressed. Lisa 
recalls that Mark was a difficult baby, 
often ‘screaming in rage’ and rarely returning affection for his parents. He 
did not respond to Lisa’s attempts 
to engage with him, often looking 
away when Lisa was talking to him. 
Lisa says that Mark always struck her 
as very different from his sister. As 
a toddler, he was frequently violent 
towards other children, trying to hurt 
them when he thought grown-ups 
were not looking. He was also cruel 
to the family pet and could not be left 
alone with it. He would deliberately 
break his big sister’s toys and there 
were many instances when he hit, 
kicked and bit her very hard. He 
appeared fearless and immune to any 
punishment, such as being made to 
sit on the ‘naughty step’ to have a 
time out. He showed little empathy 
for others and when he was asked 
to imagine how his behaviour might 
make other people feel, he simply 
looked blank.
At school, Mark’s problems 
escalated and he was eventually 
transferred to a special school for 
children with behavioural difficulties. 
This was in sharp contrast to his 
sister, who did well at school and 
had many friends. By adolescence, 
Mark’s behaviour at school was 
characterised by aggression, 
bullying, blackmail of other boys, 
attempts to intimidate members 
of staff and lack of regret for his 
actions. No sanctions imposed by 
the school staff seemed to have any 
effect on Mark. Eventually, Mark 
started to skip school and by his 
mid-teens got involved in a number 
of burglaries and robberies. His 
parents were not able to monitor 
his activities, and Mark began to 
routinely hang out with delinquent 
peers, but did not seem to have firm 
friends. Acquaintances seemed to 
come and go depending on whether 
they were of use to him. He would 
often implicate his peers if he was 
caught doing something in order to 
save his own skin. 
Eventually, in his late teens, he 
received a prison sentence for a 
violent robbery. When he was released 
from prison he continued his criminal 
lifestyle. He never settled down with 
a family but had a string of girlfriends, 
two of whom became pregnant. Mark 
showed little interest in his children 
and failed to provide any financial 
support for them. He was engaged 
in supplying drugs, was involved in 
several financial scams, and ended 
up jailed for a second time for killing 
